
















A research study submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for 












©2020 The MITRE Corporation.  




 Evaluation of covert action has been scarcely discussed in academic literature and where 
it has been there lacks consistent agreement. Methods of evaluation can encompass achievement 
of presidential policy, operational implementation, long-term strategic implications, ethical 
alignment, and the resulting human cost. This paper proposes a framework which centers on the 
immediate achievement of presidential policy as the first criterion; the operational 
implementation as the second; and the long-term implications as the third. Together, these 
criteria represent a framework to evaluate covert action allowing for an overall assessment. To 
address the third criterion of long-term strategic implications, the case of covert action in Iran is 
examined over the period of 1953-2020. This case study is limited by access to open source 
material from books, journal articles, speeches, legal filings, and declassified material sourced 
from the CIA FOIA database. Additionally, discussion avoids the actions of other actors such as 
British SIS, Israel’s MOSSAD, and the Soviet Union. What emerges in the case is an interwoven 
story of covert actions addressing different strategic interests, policy objectives, and operational 
implementation methods that complicate evaluation. There are clear failures in Iran-Contra and 
Operation Merlin, but also clear successes in Operation Olympic Games and the assassination of 
Qasem Soleimani. Where the discussion is inconclusive is Operation Ajax, which is successful 
regarding the first two criteria but is the center of debate for long-term implications. However, 
this paper argues that due to the 26-year time horizon between Operation Ajax and the Islamic 
Revolution this long-term failure is driven by U.S. foreign policy that failed to reign in the Shah. 
The other conclusion that emerges is that covert action tends to be most successful when it is 
closely tied to clear presidential policy and not used as a replacement for policy. 
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 How to evaluate covert action has been elusive in literature due to the difficulty in 
assessing that which is intended to remain in the shadows. The efforts of spymasters and spooks 
in spreading propaganda, inciting a coup d’état, or even assassinating a leader of a terrorist group 
is rarely seen by the public or acknowledged by a government. The mystery and level of 
classification surrounding covert action obfuscates how to evaluate its performance and 
understanding whether failure is a result of poor policy, poor operational implementation, or 
whether it is a tool which should be diminished in frequency. This research will attempt to build 
a case with sufficient breadth of covert action across a period of nearly seven decades targeting a 
singular adversary to better understand long-term strategic consequences as a component of the 
evaluative framework. The underlying research question attempting to be addressed is how to 
determine success or failure of covert action and whether using a framework which incorporates 
multiple criteria represents a step-forward in this evaluative process.   
Covert Action – Literature Review 
Role & Purpose 
 Covert action carries with it a mystique of the unknown or rather meant to be not known. 
In exploring covert action, it is important to make a distinction between covert action and 
espionage. Espionage, or spying, is a passive act whereby intelligence officers target and recruit 
assets from which to glean information which is of value to the interests of their state.1 This is 
distinct from covert action which is active in nature where the core purpose is to influence 
outcomes in the favor of the state.2 Conjointly, the use of the word covert implies how this action 
 
1 Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror, 210.  
2 Ibid., 210.  
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undertaken is intended to allow for plausible deniability where the act is not intended to be 
acknowledged by the United States Government.3 
 The use of covert action as a tool of international relations has existed for centuries as 
nation-states have sought to influence the behavior and outcomes of history in their favor.4 For 
the United States, these operations date back to the Revolutionary War, but have been most 
keenly understood following the establishment of a formal intelligence agency apparatus in the 
post-World War II environment. The purpose of covert action as an instrument of the executive 
has often been understood as the “third option” between diplomacy and direct military 
intervention.5 Alternatively, Prados (2006) frames covert action from the perspective of an 
international relations toolkit including it as one of five options with those being: behavior, 
diplomacy, economic sanctions, military force, and covert action.6 Nevertheless, covert action 
operates in a middle-ground whereby the president is given an additional option to address the 
challenges of implementing foreign policy to advance the interests of the United States.  
Types of Covert Action 
 There are three primary veins of covert action in propaganda, political action, and 
paramilitary operations, with information warfare being a fourth aspect of covert action as 
technology continues to alter the landscape of intelligence operations in the modern era.7 These 
varying types of covert action can be utilized alone or simultaneously to achieve specific policy 
objectives, but each has its own benefits and drawbacks.  
 
3 Kibbe, “Covert Action and the Pentagon”, 57. 
4 Cormac & Aldrich, “Grey is the New Black: Covert Action and Implausible Deniability”, 477. 
5 Johnson, National Security Intelligence, 79. 
6 Prados, Safe for Democracy, 641-645.  
7 Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action & The Presidency, 76-85. 
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 Propaganda is a widely used covert action which can achieve superior outcomes to other 
alternatives if there is “sufficient time available for it to work”.8 Propaganda is often referred to 
as either white, grey, or black indicating whether identification of the source is open, opaque, or 
fabricated.9 White propaganda is generally truthful information from official government outlets 
in order to amplify messaging abroad through explanation of policy, news, and government 
positions.10 Grey propaganda blurs the lines between truth and fiction where distortion of fact is 
a central component of the messaging to support the policy objectives of the government.11 
Black propaganda can also be understood as disinformation that it is fabricated to reinforce false 
perceptions, beliefs, or cause strife.12 Disinformation and black propaganda have historically 
been heavily utilized by Russia to heighten fracturing in the U.S. in areas such as racial 
disparities. Both grey and black propaganda rely on hiding the source to create a perception of 
the messaging being grassroots in nature where possible reinforcing belief in the message.  
 Political action encompasses a wide range of activities from funding political campaigns 
in a foreign country, to providing financial backing for a demonstration, to even instigating 
coups.13 The U.S. successful utilization of political action to spark a coup in Iran in 1953 is an 
example of how propaganda and political action are often used in conjunction and in support of 
one another to achieve an outcome. Often political action entails financial support to influence 
political outcomes in a country. This financial support is often passed through multiple entities to 
allow it to appear homegrown, so the supported party or individual is not aware of its origin.  
 
8 Ibid., 72. 
9 Ibid, 75. 
10 Ibid., 75. 
11 Ibid., 75. 
12 Ibid., 77. 
13 Ibid., 82.  
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 Paramilitary operations have increased in usage following 9/11 and the shift in focus 
towards counterterrorism. Examples of paramilitary operations include training of foreign 
military special forces, providing security to specific VIPs abroad, or even targeted 
assassination.14 While assassination was precluded from U.S. covert action in 1976, the 
authorizations surrounding the post-9/11 environment broadened the scope of activities covered 
in combatting terrorism and the armed Predator UAV has been widely used to conduct targeted 
assassination of known and suspected terrorists. 
 Information warfare (IW) is a more recent part of covert action with many of the 
activities blurring the lines between propaganda, political action, and paramilitary operations in a 
digital format.15 It has enabled a new vector through which a nation-state actor can be targeted 
with the ability to engage remotely through a plausibly deniable means.16 Additionally, the lines 
between signals intelligences (SIGINT) espionage collection activities, covert action via digital 
means, and traditional military operations have blurred as well with those activities that fall into 
covert action being defined by their active nature and coverage under Title 10. Stuxnet which 
emerged out of Operation Olympic Games is a keen example of the advanced capabilities the 
U.S. has developed in the realm of information warfare operations to inflict damage to an 
adversary while retaining physical distance and plausible deniability.  
Oversight & Congress 
 Up until the early 1970s, covert action fell under broad language included in the National 
Security Act of 1947.17 This boilerplate language provided the legal framework for the Central 
 
14 Ibid., 84.  
15 Ibid., 87. 
16 Ibid., 88. 
17 Johnson, National Security Intelligence, 79. 
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Intelligence Agency (CIA) as well as authorities under which it conducted all intelligence 
activities including covert action. The public outcry from the Vietnam War, the Watergate 
Scandal, and the exposure of the “Family Jewels” which brought to light abuses by the CIA led 
Congress into action to reign in the conduct of covert action and  associated powers of the 
President.  
 The Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was the first major 
step towards reigning in covert action under an oversight structure when passed in 1974.18 
Hughes-Ryan established the requirement of a Presidential Finding, removing plausible 
deniability that had been a corner stone of covert action.19 Additionally, Hughes-Ryan 
established a means which Congress could veto operations due to “authority to authorize and 
appropriate public funds” which is an express Constitutional authority of Congress.20 In 1980, 
the Intelligence Oversight Act amended Hughes-Ryan to allow the President to present a Finding 
in a “timely fashion.”21 This concept of timely fashion would be central in discussion on the 
subsequent Iran-Contra scandal whereby Congress was not notified in advance leading to the 
passage of the 1988 Intelligence Oversight Act which replaced the “timely fashion” verbiage 
with a forty-eight hour window.22  
 Lastly, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991 repealed Hughes-Ryan and put into statute 
stronger oversight intended to address abuses exposed in Iran-Contra which had circumvented 
normal processes by running the program out of the White House through the National Security 
 
18 Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action & the Presidency, 93. 
19 Ibid., 93. 
20 Ibid., 93. 
21 Ibid., 97. 
22 Ibid., 97. 
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Council (NSC).23 The law stipulated that no Finding could be signed retroactively and was 
required to be in writing with the President as the final signatory. Furthermore, the Finding must 
identify the program being outlined is in support of specific “identifiable policy objectives”.24  
Additionally, all U.S. agencies which would participate in the program had to be identified as 
well as any third-parties thereby addressing the circumvention used by the administration in Iran-
Contra.25 Lastly, the Act outlined that no operation could influence domestic opinion, policies, 
media, or political processes and must abide by both the Constitution and federal law.26 
How to Evaluate: Success or Failure 
 How to evaluate the success or failure of covert action is complicated by varying 
perspectives on how it should be evaluated. Treverton (2009) views the attempt at evaluation as 
speculative in nature rooted, in a retrospective analysis that considers what could have happened 
if only x, y, or z had gone differently.27 Additionally, this retrospective evaluation often makes 
the failures obvious such as the Bay of Pigs but successes such as Operation Ajax clouded by the 
events that took place in the decades that followed.28 Any event given enough time loses the 
context and immediacy of its impact when examined from far enough way and thus those covert 
actions have been muddied by the subsequent years where the failure may be a result of policy 
rather than directly tied to the covert action itself. Hulnick (1999) supports this view that judging 
the action by itself “may miss the long-term implications” and thus makes evaluating covert 
action more difficult than judging analysis or collection.29  
 
23 Ibid., 97. 
24 Ibid., 98 
25 Ibid., 98. 
26 Ibid., 98. 
27 Treverton, “Covert Action and Open Society”, 999. 
28 Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror, 212. 
29 Hulnick, Fixing the Spy Machine, 78. 
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 One of the most significant challenges associated with covert action is its classified and 
sensitive nature. The imbedded purpose of keeping the hand of the government hidden whilst 
influencing other nation-states precludes disclosure to a broad audience of the activities the U.S. 
is undertaking. This issue of classification has clouded the ability of overseers, academics, and 
the public to evaluate covert action. Widely known scandals such as the Bay of Pigs and Iran-
Contra have dominated discourse on covert action and led to accusations being levied against the 
CIA of being a “rogue elephant”.30 Even successes such as the raid on Abbottabad to kill Osama 
Bin Laden are not without their own controversy due to the high-risk nature of the operation and 
the lack of notification of Pakistan beforehand. Inevitably, covert action has and will continue to 
be controversial rooted in the paradox of being a democratic nation-state secretly meddling in the 
affairs of others.31 
 Hulnick (1999) suggests if covert action were evaluated by policymakers, the definition 
of success or failure would be tied to the outcome of the policy which oversees the action.32 
Daugherty (2004) states that a “successful outcome is one in which foreign policy objectives 
sought by the President are obtained”.33 This straightforward perspective on evaluating covert 
action provides a clear line towards evaluation by tying together the initiating purpose of the 
Finding to the action and then back to whether that policy was achieved. Further exploration is 
required in instances in which the policy was doomed to fail, and covert action was implemented 
as a last-ditch effort to save it. Covert action and policy must work in harmony where the overt 
and covert amplify one another towards a desired outcome. Lowenthal (2009) agrees that the 
 
30 Haines, “Looking for a Rogue Elephant: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA”, 5. 
31 Prados, Safe for Democracy, 647. 
32 Hulnick, Fixing the Spy Machine, 80. 
33 Ibid., 80 
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success of covert action is intertwined with the underlying policy and more likely to succeed 
when the policy goals are specific, and the operation is carefully defined.34  
 A second perspective discussed by Daugherty (2004) is whether the action was “well 
managed from an operation[al] standpoint”.35 This perspective focuses on the execution of the 
tradecraft and does not examine whether the policy objective was achieved or not. Hulnick 
(1999) assesses that the intelligence officer narrows the evaluation towards the operational 
aspects and disregards the policy it was meant to support. This narrow focus is something 
Lowenthal (2009) bemoans whereby policymakers lose sight of historic precedent and therefore 
fail to propose well developed covert action plans which are less likely to fail.36 Similarly, 
intelligence officers focus on what is in their purview and may lack the proper understanding of 
both short and long-term strategic policy objectives.  
 An alternative to these perspectives is that success or failure is best understood from the 
response of the American public once exposed.37 While public opinion can  sway for or against 
an action and policy simultaneously, it is reliant on disclosure of an action by the media and 
therefore lacks consistency in not only what is revealed but also to what extent. Connected to the 
concept of public response, Johnson (2012) discusses how varying types of action are a “ladder 
of escalation” and the larger question in evaluation is whether operations are ethically acceptable 
or not.38  Ethical considerations and the response of the public bring into consideration the 
position of the United States as a proponent of democracy and user of covert action which on the 
surface appears at odds with democratic values. From the ethical perspective, any covert action 
 
34 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 178.  
35 Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action & the Presidency, 5. 
36 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 167.  
37 Hulnick, Fixing the Spy Machine, 80 
38 Johnson, National Security Intelligence, 104. 
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incompatible with American ethics is a failure regardless of apparent strategic or operational 
success. For instance, if the ethical perspective holds that all assassination is wrong, then it 
would deem the targeted assassination of Osama bin Laden, Anwar Al-Awlaki, and Qasem 
Soleimani as all failures despite all three being operational successful and supporting specific 
presidential policy. Determining what ethical code to apply to the evaluative process is unclear 
and may require further discourse to determine applicability and measurability.  
 An additional perspective is that long-term impacts must be considered to understand 
whether an action was a success or not.39 The 1953 coup in Iran which put the Shah in power 
viewed in 1979 following the revolution seems like a failure. Similarly, the support of the 
Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s who would later become the Taliban illustrates a 
potential for blowback due to poor foresight. The inclusion of a long time-horizon considers the 
ripple effect of second and third-order effects which is missed when only examining immediate 
performance. Lowenthal (2009) also considers whether “human costs” should be a part of the 
evaluative calculus where death tolls in the decades following shape the understanding of the 
impact felt. It must be considered whether the goal is to evaluate all potential impacts from a 
covert action by capturing the nuance of the ensuing years or if by doing so the evaluation is 
diluted by history.  
 Codevilla (1992) raises the question of whether covert action has impacted the “shape, 
nature, or condition of the world”.40 Restated, if the covert action never happened would the 
world be any different? This is difficult to answer as one must consider the influence of Soviet 
active measures and the covert efforts of other nation-states. The continual utilization of covert 
 
39 Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action & The Presidency, 5.  
40 Codevilla. Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century, 241. 
10 
 
action over a long period of time suggests that policymakers and intelligence officers see value 
in its implementation and it may be impossible to address whether conflicts such as the Vietnam 
War, the revolution in Iran, or the War on Terror would have different results without. America’s 
interventionism has long been discussed and debated and thus it is possible the world in which 
we live today would in fact be different without covert action.41 
 Lastly, Executive Order (EO) 12333 offers some insight into how evaluation of covert 
action is viewed outside of academic literature. However, it is important to note that EO 12333 
has been subsequently amended three times with EO 13284 in 2003, EO 13355 in 2004, and 
13470 in 2008. The executive order states that the National Security Council (NSC) has the 
responsibility to “conduct a periodic review of ongoing covert action activities, including an 
evaluation of the effectiveness and consistency with current national policy.”42 The terminology 
of “current national policy” lacks clarity in whether that is short-term presidential policy or long-
term strategic efforts.43 Furthermore, the inclusion of the term “effectiveness” seems most 
closely aligned with operational implementation although it focuses most bluntly on whether the 
action is or is not working as intended.44 This periodic review process illuminated in the 
language of the text is insightful in that the NSC has access which outstrips the academic 
community in terms of proximity to the policymaker as well as to the underlying classified 
material which underpins the action.  
 
 
41 Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action & The Presidency, 6 
42 Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981. “United States Intelligence Activities,” Code of Federal 
Regulations, title 3 (1981): 200-216.  
43 Ibid., 2. 




 Policymakers have long tended to believe that covert action can be effective in furthering 
policy objectives. President Carter prior to his ascension to the Presidency was adverse to covert 
action but became a major proponent. President Obama was critical of President Bush over the 
Iraq War and his tactics in the “War on Terror”, but proceeded to perform a significantly more 
drone strikes against terrorists.45 Rather, the evaluation often is shades of grey where when 
viewed in different light it changes the perception. Presidents would not utilize covert action as 
often as they do if they did not believe it assisted in achieving overt policy objectives. 
Furthermore, some covert action programs span administrations showing the perceived persistent 
value over time.   
Hypothesis 
 There are three primary veins this paper will evaluate covert action. First, does the covert 
action align with and lead to outcomes that are consistent with presidential policy? If the covert 
action does not lead to furtherance of the proposed policy, then that would denote a failure. The 
second criterion is the action implemented without major error from an operational perspective.  
To address the concept of blowback, the third criteria addresses if the action led to long-term 
policy objectives of the United States. As an example, if an action increased animosity towards 
the U.S. exhibited through increased Iranian support for terrorist organizations, furthered its 
nuclear weapons ambitions, or took direct action in response to a covert action that would denote 
a failure even if that blowback response occurred years later. The nuance to consider in the cases 
of potential blowback is whether policy decisions in the intervening years were the driving factor 
 
45 Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror, 231. 
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rather than the action. Together, these three criteria build a framework from which to address the 
research question centered on evaluation of covert action. The hypothesis for this research is that 
covert action will be successful when closely aligned with defined presidential policy, is 
implemented in line with operational tradecraft, and supports long-term strategic objectives.   
Method 
 The qualitative method utilized is the case study. The case study to be examined is CIA 
covert action in Iran spanning from 1953-2020 starting with Operation Ajax and ending with the 
targeted assassination of Qasem Soleimani. The nearly seven decades as well as five covert 
actions being studied within the case allow significant narrative depth from which to draw 
conclusions. This paper will present the five covert actions in chronological order. This 
chronological progression is meant to capture the underlying policy of the presidential 
administrations as well as provide a narrative discussion on the progression of covert action in 
Iran over the period. The selected covert actions encompassed in the case are as follows: 
Operation Ajax, Iran-Contra, Operation Merlin, Operation Olympic Games, and the assassination 
of Qasem Soleimani.  
Data 
 While much of the covert action surrounding Iran remains classified, this case study 
utilizes open source material to construct a narrative. The source material spans published books, 
speeches, journal articles, official reports, newspaper articles, and primary source documents 
pulled from the CIA’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) database that has been sanitized and 
declassified. The utilization of declassified material allows insight into policy objectives and 
operational background particularly as it relates to Operation Ajax and Iran-Contra. Additionally, 
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the data is bounded on U.S. action in Iran and does not address open source material on other 
third-party actors such as SIS or MOSSAD who may have partnered with the United States. 
Furthermore, the data will focus almost exclusively on covert action while limiting discussion on 
military action, embargos, sanctions, and other tools of U.S. policy. This bounding of the case 
study is pivotal to keeping the research study focused and scoped.  
Operation Ajax 
 The end of World War II brought about a restructuring of the global paradigm with the 
capitalistic United States positioned against the communist Soviet Union in a struggle for global 
hegemony. The rise of nuclear weapons, the collapse of British imperialism in the years to 
follow, and the establishment of the Bretton Woods systems would all underpin the ensuing 
decades of conflict known as the Cold War where the Americans and Soviets would seek to gain 
dominance through proxies and covert action amongst other tools. The Cold War was not a 
conflict fought head-to-head but was a game of chess fought in the shadows where ideas such as 
domino theory and the various Cold War doctrines would come to embody U.S. foreign policy in 
the post-1945 environment. The focus on presidential administrations from Truman through the 
first Bush were on toppling the Soviet Union and containing the spread of communism.46 
 In March of 1947, President Truman announced what would become known as the 
Truman Doctrine where the policy of the U.S. was to “support free peoples who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures”.47 This doctrine was 
foundational in interventions in Korea and subsequent iterations of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the 
Nixon Doctrine, and so on where the policy of the United States was to combat the rise of 
 
46 Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action & The Presidency, 1.  
47 Kenneth Thompson, The Carter Doctrine, 190.  
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communism or the appearance of communism globally.48 In accompaniment with the 
announcement to the Truman Doctrine, President Truman would go on to sign the classified 
NSC 10/2 which authorized the CIA to conduct covert action globally to combat the communist 
Soviet Union.49 In this endeavor, Iran which shared a border with the Soviet Union, had strategic 
access to the Persian Gulf, and had significant reserves of oil represented a key piece in U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East and Asia.50  
 The Eisenhower administration retained several of the policies implemented during the 
Truman era.51 Where Eisenhower differed from his predecessor was that he was more willing “to 
adopt assertive policies that used a wider range of instruments” including covert action as 
evidenced by efforts in Iran, Guatemala, and elsewhere.52 Despite his prolific military 
background, Eisenhower leaned heavily on covert action as a means to conduct foreign policy in 
the midst of the Cold War. This maintained a level of plausible deniability that avoided 
additional military confrontation and advanced U.S. interests abroad. To this end, Eisenhower 
enumerated further on the Truman Doctrine by establishing the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 
following the Suez Crisis whereby a Middle Eastern country could receive economic and 
military aid to combat threats to those nation-states from “any nation controlled by international 
communism”.53 This doctrine further established the U.S. efforts of containment against 
communist spread and identified the strategic value of the Middle East due to its vast oil 
reserves.54 
 
48 Klare, “Oil, Iraq, and American Foreign Policy: The continuing Salience of the Carter Doctrine”, 32. 
49 Little, Mission Impossible, 670.  
50 Marsh, “The United States, Iran, and Operation ‘Ajax’”, 3. 
51 Ibid., 1. 
52 Ibid., 1. 
53 Ibid., 2.  
54 Ibid., 1.  
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 The roots of Operation Ajax lie in a dispute that began to surface late in 1948 when the 
government of Iran invited the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (AIOC), now known as British 
Petroleum (BP), to renegotiate the terms of the 1933 oil concession which were unfavorable to 
Iran.55 Concern over the loss of revenue to Iran continued to amplify and the British access to 
Iranian oil was put into severe jeopardy when Prime Minister Mossadegh sought to nationalize 
Iran’s oil in 1951.56 Mossadegh’s ascension to power and push to nationalize oil posed 
significant threat to British access of a strategic and lucrative resource.57 Although Mossadegh 
sought to democratize and modernize Iran, he stood at odds with monarch Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, also known as the Shah, due to the potential reduction in authority he would face should 
those desires come to pass.58  
 In response to nationalization, Britain attempted to get the U.S. to agree to measures 
which would remove Mossadegh which the Truman administration was not agreeable to. 
However, Britain began to frame the concern over Mossadegh’s nationalization in line with fears 
of the spread of communism in Iran which fed into concerns the U.S. had regarding the potential 
domino of nations into socialism.59 In light of potential communist influence, Iran represented an 
increasingly strategic piece of U.S. interests in the Middle East altering the U.S. perception of 
the issue of Mossadegh.60 The British eventually invited Kermit Roosevelt to London where they 
pitched the plan to overthrow Mossadegh and upon Eisenhower taking office were able to 
convince the CIA to put implement a plan that would eventually foment a coup.61  
 
55 Marsh, “The United States, Iran and Operation ‘Ajax’”, 2 
56 Lomas, “Not-so-secret Operation”, 16. 
57 Morgan, “U.S. – Iran Relations”, 1 
58 Ibid., 1.  
59 Lomas, “Not-so-secret operation”, 16. 
60 Marsh, “The United States, Iran and Operation ‘Ajax’”, 3.  
61 Little, “Mission Impossible”, 665. 
16 
 
 The plan involved spending $150,000 to bribe individuals such as journalists, preachers, 
and others who could amplify a message of distrust in Mossadegh’s government.62 In 
conjunction, the CIA utilized General Zahedi whom they selected to lead the coup to bribe key 
government officials with an additional $11,000 per week. This amplification of distrust in the 
public sphere coupled with bribery in the government would allow for Parliament to demand 
Mossadegh’s removal and if refused would give General Zahedi the bandwidth to use military 
means to remove him from power.63 The Shah would then issue a royal decree demanding 
Mossadegh step-down and installing Zahedi.64 However, this plan almost collapsed on August 
13, 1953 when Mossadegh refused and instead issued an arrest warrant for Zahedi leading the 
Shah to flee to Rome.65 Ultimately, the CIA was able to mobilize “pro-western elements in the 
Iranian army” resulting in Mossadegh being deposed on August 19th and the Shah returning to 
power and cementing U.S. influence in the region for the next 26 years.66  
 The subsequent period under the Shah’s rule saw U.S. efforts in covert action expand, 
largely thanks to the success of Operation Ajax. In this way, the immediate success led to a long-
term strategic shift in U.S. intelligence operations and the use of covert action abroad in places 
such as Guatemala, Cuba, and elsewhere.67 While conflict emerged between Israel and Arab 
nation-states during this period, the U.S. relied on Iran as a means of stability in the region to 
both oil assets and the prevention of communist encroachment. However, the U.S. was 
uninterested in reigning in the behavior and corruption of the Shah, eventually leading to a 
growing distrust and disdain amongst the Iranian citizens as levels of inflation and inequality 
 
62 Morgan, “U.S. – Iran Relations”, 2. 
63 Ibid., 2.  
64 Ibid., 2.  
65 Little, “Mission Impossible”, 666.  
66 Ibid., 666.   
67 Ibid., 666. 
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continued to rise.68 The eventual eruption of student led protests starting in early 1978 ultimately 
led to a full-scale revolution whereby the Shah was deposed, and the new regime of Ayatollah 
Khomeini viewed the U.S. as an enemy of Iran.   
Iran-Contra 
 The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran caught the CIA and U.S. leadership by surprise 
leading to the well-known hostage crisis which would persist for 444 days.69 President Carter in 
the aftermath no longer had an ally but instead a vowed foe chanting “death to America”.70 This 
anti-American sentiment fueled by perceptions amongst Iranians of U.S. interference in their 
affairs dating back to the 1953 overthrow of Mossadegh and subsequent years of oppression and 
corruption under the Shah of Iran.71 Carter in his 1980 State of the Union address first 
enumerated on what would become known as the Carter Doctrine in declaring that access to oil 
in the Persian Gulf was of “vital interest” to the United States and any effort to prevent this 
access would be addressed via “any means necessary”.72 This doctrine would become formative 
U.S. policy which has continued across the past four decades differing from prior doctrines 
focused on containment of communism that fell aside post-Cold War.73 Nevertheless, Carter’s 
administration was tainted by its failure to prevent the revolution in Iran and for the subsequent 
hostage crisis. 
 President Reagan on ascending to the Presidency had to grapple with many issues, chief 
amongst them a drastically different Middle East than had been present during the preceding few 
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decades. Although the hostages returned just after his inauguration, the 1980s would be marked 
by terrorism from Shi’ite groups loyal to and backed by Iran throughout the Middle East.74 
Additional hostage crises took place in Lebanon as well as a devasting terror attack in Beirut in 
1983 which killed 241 marines.75 The destabilizing efforts of Iran were felt sharply and 
significant concern surrounded the spread of radical Islamic doctrine which threatened not only 
U.S. interests but Israeli as well. Furthermore, according to declassified CIA records, the U.S. 
despite grappling with the spike in terrorism was giving consideration to the path-forward for a 
potential post-Khomeini Iran given his poor health at the time and belief the regime would fail to 
persist.76 
 Coupled with the rise of terrorism and radical Islamic theocracy in the Middle East, Iraqi 
leader Saddam Hussein believed that Iran was in a position of weakness shortly following the 
revolution and thus launched an invasion in 1980 which would kick off the Iran-Iraq War from 
1980-1988.77 In the midst of the war, intelligence reports indicated that the Soviet Union was 
supplying material support to Iraq and thus Iran was on the precipice of defeat.78 Additionally, 
the production of mustard gas and nerve agents by Iraq for use in the war represented a dramatic 
shift in the conflict violating Geneva Conventions.79 In the face of conventional capabilities of 
Iraq, Soviet support, and chemical weapon usage, Iran was facing a significant uphill battle in 
winning the war and thus was open to Israeli and U.S. assistance in the form of armaments.80 
Amongst the armaments needed were American Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided 
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(T.O.W) antitank missiles and spare parts for the F-4 Phantom and C-130 transport which could 
help counter Iraqi conventional forces.81 The provision of these armaments led to what ultimately 
would become Iran-Contra.82  
 For Israel, which had bombed the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak in 1980, there was 
concern that Iraq would turn its attention towards Israel after defeating Iran.83 In addition, U.S. 
hostages were being held in Lebanon by Iran proxy Hezbollah.84 Ultimately, Israeli Director 
General David Kimche of Israel’s Foreign Ministry along with other government officials 
proposed an exchange of U.S. arms for hostages utilizing Israel as a third party cut-out.85 
Following the prolonged hostage crisis under the Carter administration, Reagan sought to avoid a 
similar outcome and thus wanted decisive action to free American citizens abroad.86 Reagan’s 
Finding on the action was based on an intent to see a “more moderate Iranian government” and 
that by providing this support it could change “personnel and attitudes”.87 However, the action of 
selling arms to Iran was a risky proposition given strong public opposition towards Iran 
following the revolution which resulted in the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis. 
 Where Iran-Contra got into murky legal waters, was the decision that the operation would 
be run out of the National Security Council (NSC) by Lt. Col. Oliver North and Admiral John 
Poindexter, the National Security Advisor, instead of the CIA. The decision to run it through the 
NSC was done to circumvent congressional oversight and keep a tight watch on the operation.88 
Eventually, North proposed circumventing the Boland Amendment which prevented 
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congressional funding from going to the Contras in Nicaragua by overcharging the Iranians for 
the TOW missiles and laundering the money through an intermediary.89 Once the excess revenue 
was passed through an intermediary and a Swiss held bank-account, it made its ways to the 
Contras where the administration was seeking to defeat the Sandinistas backed by the communist 
Cubans.90 The covert support for the Sandinistas had been authorized in a prior Findings in 1981, 
1983, and 1986. Eventually, the Iranians discovered they were being severely overcharged for 
the TOWs and the excess was funding a covert war in Nicaragua; thus, in October of 1986 they 
leaked the operation to a newspaper in Lebanon.91 The Iranians were infuriated by the actions of 
the U.S. and Israel due to perceived hypocrisy and devious intentions by the West.92 
 Ultimately, the Iran-Iraq war would lead to the loss of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi and 
Iranian lives, crippling their economies and increasing the distrust of global institutions in Iran 
following the failure of the U.N. to condemn Iraq following its use of chemical weapons.93 Iran-
Contra after its exposure caused a flurry of press attention centered on the White House handling 
of the affair. The CIA in response to the exposure, released an internal memorandum to all 
employees which outlined the action and claimed lack of involvement and focused on the efforts 
of Lt. Col. North.94 The ensuing Congressional inquiries could do nothing to fix the damage done 
to American foreign policy, but they sought to expand oversight putting into place new 
requirements around Findings, notification, and ability of Congress to restrict covert action 
through its budgetary control and oversight which persists today.95   
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 When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, it shifted U.S. policymaker focus away 
from traditional Cold War policy towards what that collapse meant for broader strategic goals. 
Analysis of the strategic threats facing the U.S. were less clear than they had been in the 
preceding decades as the world was no longer a juxtaposition of two superpowers. Concern rose 
in the proliferation community that the dissolution of the Soviet Union would lead to increased 
proliferation. The Communist state provided a level of stability that was no longer present in its 
collapse and with Iran bordering the now weakened Russia, the possibility of nuclear technology 
or weapons reaching Iran was one of many concerns in the aftermath.  
 The post-Cold War environment led successive administrations to be concerned about the 
strategic threat that Iran represented as well as their destabilizing efforts via state sponsored 
terrorism. Increasingly, U.S. counterproliferation efforts focused on the chance that rogue 
nations such as Iran or North Korea would attain nuclear weapon state status. To this end, the 
U.S. began a heavy sanctions regime as evidenced by the passage of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
1996.96 These sanctions were the first in a series of eight additional rounds of sanctions from 
1996 to 2012 passed in an effort to not only combat proliferation efforts of Iran but their support 
for terrorism.97  
 To this end, Operation Merlin represented an effort by the Clinton administration to 
utilize covert action to stall the nuclear ambitions of Iran through industrial sabotage. Through 
Operation Merlin, the CIA sought to provide flawed blueprints to Iran via a defected Russian 
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scientist.98 These blueprints included design flaws which would prevent the nuclear technology 
from being operational, but those flaws were allegedly obvious enough to be noticed quickly.99 
Nevertheless, the CIA directed the Russian scientist to provide the blueprints to the Iranians at 
their embassy in Vienna.100  
 James Risen exposed Operation Merlin in his 2006 book, State of War, which discussed 
the operation in detail.101 Additionally, his book included a copy of a letter written to the Iranians 
from the Russian scientist outlining the nuclear plans provided.102 Prior to publication of the 
book, Risen had sought publication of the story while working at The New York Times in 2003 
and notified the CIA of this intent.103 However, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet 
and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice implored The New York Times to not publish 
the material out of concern of irreparable damage to national security and exposure of sources 
and methods.104 The Times agreed to not proceed with publication, but in 2006 with Risen’s 
inclusion of the sensitive material in his book the story was no longer buried. In depositions, 
Risen stated that his reason for publication was the U.S. failed to provide evidence of WMDs in 
Iraq and he was seeking to expose faulty intelligence thereby avoiding potential malfeasance and 
possible war.105 
 The U.S. government immediately began investigating potential leaks settling on former 
CIA Directorate of Operations employee Jeffrey Sterling, who worked at the agency from 1993 
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to 2002.106 Sterling has been described as a disgruntled former employee of the CIA who in 2000 
filed a discrimination complaint alleging that he had been passed over for assignments due to 
him being African American.107 Furthermore, it was Risen who had written publicly about 
Sterling’s discrimination suit in 2002 and subsequent phone and email records established the 
link between Risen and Sterling as the source.108 Additionally, Sterling had met with two Senate 
Intelligence Committee staffers surrounding the program in 2003 to bring light to his firing as 
well as the operation.109 Sterling was charged with 10 felony counts in 2008 and prosecuted 
under the Espionage Act by the Obama administration for providing the classified intelligence 
regarding Operation Merlin.110 Among the information that Sterling provided was a classified 
memorandum outlining the program.111 His subsequent conviction and appeal illustrated not only 
the seriousness of the breach, but also evidenced the approach the Obama administration was 
taking on leaks given high profile exposures from Snowden, Manning, and others.112  
Operation Olympic Games 
 U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century has undoubtedly been shaped by the events of 
September 11th, 2001. The loss of life and the devastation caused by Al-Qaeda gave rise to the 
U.S. “War on Terror” and the elevated military and intelligence activity surrounding the Middle 
East. Terrorism demonstrated its devastating potential to pierce the veil of safety in the homeland 
and the strategic threat that unchecked rogue terrorist groups could be to U.S. national security. 
Iran, in the immediate aftermath of Al-Qaeda’s attack, opened lines of communication and 
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assisted in the targeting and capture of parties responsible.113 However, this did not prevent 
President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union from including Iran as a member of the “axis of 
evil” due to its proclivity for state sponsorship of terrorism, covert pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), and human rights abuses.114  
 The military action in Afghanistan and the subsequent invasion of Iraq demonstrated the 
aggressive posture of the Bush administration in the “War on Terror”.115 However, failure to 
produce evidence if Iraq’s WMD program following the invasion hurt public support for the 
administration. Despite International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports regarding a covert 
nuclear weapons program in Iran, the administration needed alternatives to direct military 
intervention.116 The administration increasingly relied on special operations forces under Title 10 
and covert action.117 Additionally, through the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) 
passed in 2001, the administration was able to conduct targeted assassinations via the CIA 
Predator drone platform carrying Hellfire missiles.118 This legal authorization removed the 
precedent set in the 1976 Executive Order signed by President Ford which banned 
assassinations.119 Instead, terrorist targets were considered enemy combatants who posed 
imminent threats to U.S. military forces and thus were legitimate targets.120  
 Although there is not space within the context of this case to address the warrantless 
wiretap program, there was expansion of state security in the context of combatting terrorism 
which eroded the freedoms and privileges of the U.S. populous and gave leeway to the 
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Intelligence Community.121 It was in this context that several covert actions were implemented 
with Operation Olympic Games being notable for the evolution and inclusion of cyber 
information warfare toolkits.122 Operation Olympic Games was launched in 2006 with an intent 
on slowing the advancement of Iran’s covert nuclear program through advanced development of 
malware and other targeted cyber-weapons.123 This program was partially initiated following 
failure to prove the presence of WMDs in Iraq and to prevent Israel from taking more drastic 
action in bombing Iranian nuclear infrastructure as they had done to Iraq in 1980.124 
Furthermore, the utilization of a cyber covert action allowed for lower probability of retaliation 
and increased deniability to the U.S. barring major intelligence leaks like those from NSA 
contractor Edward Snowden.125 The combination of Israeli intelligence regarding Iranian nuclear 
infrastructure and the joint cyber capabilities of the U.S. and Israel allowed for development of 
the virus now known as Stuxnet.126 
 Stuxnet derived its name from security researchers at Kaspersky’s lab who first 
discovered and released findings regarding the virus.127 Although the U.S. and Israel never 
officially acknowledged their role, the determination from researchers looking at the source-code 
was that it was jointly written by Israel and the U.S. to target a specific industrial supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) system which ran “Siemens Simatic Step 7” software.128 
This targeting of SCADA systems was unique because it allowed for targeted damage to be done 
to the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz while leaving other systems it infected unharmed 
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representing one of the most advanced precision cyber-weapons ever uncovered.129 The virus 
once circumventing the air gapped systems at Natanz were able to alter the speed of centrifuges 
to not only destroy the centrifuges but also spoil the enrichment activity while reporting normal 
operating conditions to the controller.130  
 Ultimately, over 30,000 IP addresses were infected via Stuxnet demonstrating advanced 
capabilities of precision targeting by the U.S. and Israelis.131 Although, the IAEA had noted in 
reports the destruction and damage of between 1,000 to 2,000 centrifuges at Natanz and 
confusion amongst Iranians regarding the underlying cause, the role of the virus was unknown at 
the time.132 The ability to inflict physical destruction through a cyberattack opened the doors for 
a suite of future covert action.133  Although Stuxnet was exposed, it represented a major step 
forward in precision cyber-weapons and allowed for disruption of the Iranian nuclear program 
pushing Iran towards the subsequent nuclear deal reached in 2015. Without the combination of 
Operation Olympic Games, sanctions against Iran, underlying propaganda efforts, and overt 
pressure from the U.S. it is potentially unlikely that the moderate President Rouhani would have 
been elected. Furthermore, it is plausible that Iran would have already developed nuclear 
weapons.134 
Targeted Assassination of Qasem Soleimani 
 The Obama administration sought to narrow the focus of engagement in the Middle East 
and seeking to recall troops after an increasingly costly Iraq War. While Obama pulled out of 
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Iraq and created a vacuum which would create the environment under which ISIS emerged, he 
was continuing to heavily utilize covert actions which had begun under previous administrations 
such as the Predator program and Operation Olympic Games. The armed UAV Predator program 
was able to circumvent the ban on assassination put into place under President Ford’s 1976 
Executive Order through language in the AUMF which justified the killings as assassinating 
targets engaged in terrorism which posed immediate danger to U.S. citizens and personnel.135 
This same legal justification would underpin the Finding which authorized the drone strike on 
Qasem Soleimani.  
 Obama’s policy in the Middle East sought to distance the U.S. from Israel to improve 
relations with Iran. With Iran, he focused almost exclusively on the issue of proliferation 
choosing to not allow sponsorship of terrorism or human rights violations prevent a deal from 
being reached.136 The creation of daylight between the U.S. and Israel was pivotal in 
rapprochement towards Iran to tamp down conflict between the two adversaries.137 This effort to 
bring Iran to the table was meant to minimize the risk associated with their civilian nuclear 
program which many viewed as a thinly veiled cover for a covert military program due to the 
overwhelming oil abundance and lack of need.138 The combination of sanctions against Iran, 
overt pressure, and success of covert action via Operation Olympic Games helped coerce Iran to 
agree to what would become the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).139 Signed on 14 
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July 2015, the JCPOA outlined limitations and restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in return for the 
lifting of economic sanctions.140  
 To understand how the Trump administration, just five years after the signing of the Iran 
Deal, arrived at authorizing via a Finding the targeted assassination of Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC) Major General Qasem Soleimani it is important to recognize the difference 
in Presidential policy.141 The Trump administration conducted a more aggressive foreign policy 
towards Iran as well as Russia and China what is colloquially termed Great Power Competition. 
Furthermore, the Trump Administration focused on defeating radical elements such as ISIS 
which had emerged under the Obama administration, but also was keenly focused on keeping 
nation-state adversaries in check to protect U.S. hegemonic position. The targeted assassination 
of Qasem Soleimani was a departure from long-established U.S. foreign policy by holding Iran 
accountable for the actions of proxy groups it funded and supported.142  
 The roots of this shift in policy began when Trump ascended office, but took formality in 
the issuance of NSPM-11 which withdrew from the 2015 JCPOA agreement citing Iran’s lack of 
compliance, state sponsorship of terrorism, and human right violations for reasons why the U.S. 
would no longer abide by the agreement.143 The formal withdrawal from the agreement was one 
of many escalatory stances the administration took in addressing Iran and combating terrorism in 
the Middle East. While the Obama administration had been willing to create daylight between 
the U.S. and Israel, the Trump administration closed that gap and shifted towards a containment 
policy which harshly punished Iran for its destabilizing effect on the Middle East.144 
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 Following withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran and the United States have been engaged in 
an increasingly public escalation of both word and action. Iran has postured itself more militarily 
going so far as to shoot down a U.S. surveillance drone in the Strait of Hormuz; increased 
support for rogue terrorist elements; and publicly stated its unwillingness to abide by the terms of 
the JCPOA.145 The announcement of the downing and the protection of Iran’s “territorial 
integrity” was made by Maj. General Qasem Soleimani in the immediate aftermath.146 The U.S. 
through a series of increased sanctions and maximum pressure on Iran has sought to effect 
change of behavior in the regime beyond nuclear ambition and bring broader peace to the region 
marred by terror, civil war, and instability.147 So far, that maximum pressure campaign has 
strained the finances of Iran and slowed the flow of oil exports. 
 The escalation between the two reached a peak following a December 27th, 2019 rocket 
attack by Iran-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah on a military base near Kirkuk which resulted in the 
death of a U.S. contractor and wounding of six additional servicemembers with four being U.S. 
military.148 However, it is important to note that it was not a single killing of a U.S. contractor 
which resulted in this drastic action, but rather years of harm caused to the U.S. via Iranian 
proxies.149 Soleimani had been leading the IRGC from 1998-2020 nearly unchallenged and was a 
cult hero in Iran, representing a target that would be comparable to the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense.150  In a statement released by the Department of Defense following the action against 
Soleimani, the U.S. Government cited the need to protect U.S. personnel as the underlying 
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justification for undertaking the action.151 The Soleimani killing on January 3rd, 2020 was a 
departure from established U.S. policy and held accountable the decisionmaker who was behind 
the deaths of over 600 troops and the wounding of thousands more via proxies.152  
 While the decision to assassinate a high-level member of an opposing nation-state seems 
brash, it is important to note that the Finding which authorized the killing of Soleimani was 
underpinned by legal foundation in the AUMF, Congressional Oversight, and significant 
planning on the part of the Intelligence Community and the U.S. military.153 The strike on the 
convoy which Q Soleimani was a part of in the early hours of January 3rd leaving the airport in 
Iraq minimized the potential risk to non-enemy combatants.154 Furthermore, by using precision 
guided missiles fired from a drone platform it reduced risk to potential U.S. personnel engaged in 
the strike while allowing for specific targeting that was proportional to the mission. Had the U.S. 
struck Soleimani outside of Iraq it would have lacked the same legal foundation that is present 
due to his presence in Iraq and underlying support for proxies therein which had caused 
significant and continuing harm to U.S. personnel.  
Discussion 
 Viewed in concert, the results of covert action in Iran has been a mixture of success and 
failure with some more recent actions unable to be evaluated from a long-term perspective due to 
the recency of the action. While some authors would argue that the long-term effect of Operation 
Ajax was negative, there are significant additional variables introduced across a 26-year period 
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to make this definitive. Before exploring the evaluation results of each case, they can be more 









Operation Ajax Success Success Mixed 
Iran-Contra Failure Failure Failure 
Operation Merlin Failure Failure Failure 
Operation Olympic Games Success Success Unknown 
Assassination of Soleimani Success Success Unknown 
 
Operation Ajax  
 Operation Ajax became the blueprint for future covert action efforts in Guatemala and 
elsewhere due to the level of success achieved.155 The combined efforts of British SIS and the 
CIA were able to achieve the desired outcomes of the administration in removing Mossadegh 
from power, installing the Shah who was friendly to the U.S., and preventing the nationalization 
of Iranian oil. This thread of concern over the security and access to oil in the Middle East has 
remained a common theme for U.S. policymakers over the past seven decades and although 
Operation Ajax predates the Carter Doctrine, its goals harkens to the same philosophic 
underpinning.156 Operation Ajax was implemented seamlessly from an operational standpoint in 
terms of political action, propaganda, and coup d’état coming together as planned. However, 
Operation Ajax serves as an example of blowback where it fomented the very seeds of the 
Islamic Revolution which would overthrow the Shah in 1979 and lead to an altered strategic 
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landscape in the Middle East.157 There remains 26 years between the installation of the Shah and 
his fall that includes several other variables.158 The span of time muddles the retrospective 
examination and thus it could be argued that the subsequent revolution in Iran was driven by a 
failure of U.S. policy rather than the single ripple effect of Operation Ajax. The U.S. failure to 
control the Shah of Iran and turning a blind eye to the actions of powers who were friendly to the 
U.S. and anti-communist was a downfall of the policies of several administrations during the 
Cold War years. The singular focus on preventing the spread of communism prevented the U.S. 
from objectively evaluating those foreign leaders it aligned itself with to the detriment of global 
perception of U.S. interference in the affairs of others.  
Iran-Contra 
 Iran-Contra remains a black mark on covert action nearly four decades later as a clear 
example of failure. Firstly, Iran-Contra was a failure in its ability to achieve presidential policy 
in the short-term. The mixing of policy objectives between support for the Contras in Nicaragua 
and funneling arms to Iran to foster goodwill to a potential successor to the Ayatollah 
complicated the actions intent. Furthermore, the decision to run the covert action out of the 
White House via the NSC to avoid Congressional Oversight and circumvent U.S. law put this 
action on the side criminal behavior.159 The sloppiness of the operational implementation is 
amplified by the fact that Iran leaked the details to the press resulting in Congressional inquiries, 
substantial backlash, and the passage of new oversight laws directly because of the action.160 The 
mixing of poor policy with poor implementation due to the utilization of non-professional 
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intelligence officers to run the program significantly endangered U.S. strategic interests and set-
back relations between Iran and the U.S. nearly permanently by demonstrating a duplicitous 
motive.161 Covert action cannot solve poor policy, and the desire to see it make amends in 
multiple fronts from Iran to Nicaragua was ill-conceived.162 Lastly, the long-term implications of 
Iran-Contra are clear in that it has altered the path of covert action by burdening it in additional 
oversight as well as doing little to change the course of U.S.-Iran relations long-term. The 
Ayatollah Khomeini remains in power with a populace which is still fervently opposed to the 
United States meaning that little has changed over the course of the past four decades and Iran-
Contra shoulders much of that blame.   
Operation Merlin 
 While the overall accuracy of the exposed material of Operation Merlin cannot be 
verified because of existing classification, it represented a significant breach to a program which 
failed on multiple fronts. Although the blueprints were meant to be flawed to sabotage the 
program, the action was an operational failure due to the easy identification. Therefore, it is 
possible that the blueprints harmed U.S. security interests by providing valuable information to 
Iran’s nuclear program in the midst of sanctions implementation.163 Additionally, the exposure 
once made public was embarrassing to an administration which was already dealing with Risen’s 
exposure of the warrantless wiretap program as well as a failure to produce evidence of WMDs 
in Iraq.164 Although Operation Merlin was implemented under the Clinton administration 
beginning in 1997, its exposure coincided with growing distrust and angst amongst the American 
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public surrounding U.S. intervention in the Middle East.165 In summary, Operation Merlin failed 
in terms of short-term policy to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program; failed in operational 
implementation due to poor conception of the covert action; and failed in regard to long-term 
policy objectives of preventing Iran’s nuclear ambition.  
Operation Olympic Games  
 Operation Olympic Games which gave rise to the likes of cyber information warfare tools 
such as Stuxnet was a successful covert action in short-term policy, operational implementation, 
and long-term policy objectives. Although the Trump Administration subsequently pulled out of 
the JCPOA via NPSM-11, the Stuxnet virus was successful in sabotaging the centrifuges at 
Natanz and slowing the nuclear weapons development of Iran.166 Additionally, it demonstrated a 
substantial advancement in cyber operation capabilities by bypassing air gapped systems and 
harming only the intended target of industrial computers at Natanz.167 The key observation of 
Operation Olympic Games is that it allowed for the development of a suite of cyber information 
warfare tools which allow for highly targeted penetration and sabotage operations.168 The ability 
to target exactly, while limiting periphery damage, is key in keeping any cyber covert action 
clearly aligned with short-term and long-term policy objectives while also maintaining a level of 
plausible deniability.169 Although subsequent leaks of U.S. cyber capabilities by Edward 
Snowden and others have compromised operational security there is undoubtable progress made 
 
165 Pincus, “Twisted view of CIA’s Operation Merlin”.  
166 Chovančík, “Iran Coercion Success and the Use of Non-Kinetic Tools”, 266. 
167 Berghel, “A Farewell to Air Gaps, Part 1”, 64.  
168 Ibid., 67.   
169 Chovančík, Martin. 2016. “Iran Coercion Success and the Use of Non-Kinetic Tools, 265. 
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in the advancement of information warfare in the covert action toolkit to assist presidential 
policy.170 
Targeted Assassination: Qassim Soleimani   
 The targeted assassination of IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimani represents a 
success of both short-term policy and operational implementation.171 However, it is too soon to 
know the long-term policy implications and whether that will result in increased Iranian 
hostilities or further desires to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent long-term. The willingness 
to assassinate a high-level target in Soleimani was a divergence from prior policy positions and 
holds Iran accountable for the actions of its proxies.172 Additionally, the subsequent 
announcement on January 10th, 2020 announcing new sets of sanctions against Iran further 
demonstrated the foreign policy posture of the administration to hold Iran accountable and 
punish them for their actions.173 The response of Iran in the immediate aftermath in launching a 
missile attack which resulted in no loss of life demonstrated restraint by the Iranians and a 
simultaneous acknowledgement of their weaker military position by having a “proportional” 
response.174 This is not to say that this action could not lead to a future event of more significant 
magnitude. Since the action only took place less than a year ago, it is too premature to evaluate 
the long-term consequences of the assassination but it does shift the trajectory long-term by 
resetting expectations between Iran and the U.S. in-line with the strategy of maximum pressure. 
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 Covert action cannot replace bad policy, but it can amplify the impact of well-thought out 
and solid policy. The United States does not have the privilege of abandoning covert action for a 
gentleman’s understanding of being above board and by-the-rules with adversaries such as 
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. The U.S. must make every effort to utilize every tool in its 
disposal. Understanding the inherent, albeit complicated value of covert action, is pivotal in the 
strategic calculus of foreign policy and global politics. While evaluation is hampered by 
classification restrictions by outsiders in the academic community, the use by presidential 
administrations of covert action as a policy instrument can be successful if the Finding which 
underpins the action is well-defined, bracketed in scope, and has high likelihood of operational 
success. Overly complex policies and covert actions where the action is attempting to buoy a 
failing policy will rarely be successful, and thus it would be wise for administrations to only 
utilize covert action in furtherance of defined objectives.  
 A framework for examining how covert action contributes to short-term policy 
objectives, long-term policy objectives, and operational implementation gives a more fulsome 
evaluative criterion from which to understand success or failure. Ultimately, does it matter if a 
covert action was flawless in its tradecraft if it did nothing to further the policy objective it was 
meant to support? In the same vein, policy objectives must be achievable otherwise covert action 
is no better than no action. Overt policy and covert action work in concert to magnify the desired 
effect and so as overt policy is continually held up to the microscope by the public audience so 
too must covert action be evaluated in the appropriate realm to make sure that the parallel track 
remains in line. Covert action should and will remain an essential element of U.S. foreign policy 
and at the ready for any presidential administration who seeks to maximize their objectives.  
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 Further exploration of this topic area could be conducted in a follow-on dissertation or 
book. Due to the scope of this study, the narrative depth of the case study would benefit from 
expanded discussion in which the details allow for further insight to emerge particularly in 
regard to policy background, Presidential administrations, history of Iran, and the actions of 
Israel in Iran. Although the academic community is limited in its access to classified data, it 
would be worthwhile in exploring the usefulness of an evaluative framework to shape 
unclassified thought and discussion regarding covert action. The continued pace of covert action, 
whether by Israel or the U.S., in Iran demonstrates the importance to both present discussion in 
the defense and intelligence communities but also in the academic community. Covert actions 
place in U.S. policy is unlikely to subside and thus it must be further understood and evaluated.  
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